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Introduction 
Since August 2007 we are experiencing in the international financial market what many 
call the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 20s. Housing prices are 
falling after a decade of sky-rock flight in a worrying bubble-bust fashion, banks are 
experiencing huge losses due to “ponzi” investments betting on the never-ending house 
market inflation, financial innovations spread the losses to the entire bank system so 
that even a medium-size financial institution are likely to be seen as too-big-to-fail.  
Many authors try to give a systemic view of the Subprime phenomenon and the 
consequent financial and economic crisis (Gorton, 2008 and Brunnermeier,2008 are two 
good examples), trying to deciphering all the main variables which probably took us at 
this point (housing bubble, securitisation, leverage and shortening of the debt maturity 
structure, rating agency models,…). With this paper we focus the more on a particular 
feature of the crisis: the tension in the money market and specifically the inter-
relationship between collateralized short term debt markets and the unsecured interbank 
market. 
In fact, one of the most puzzling phenomena we are facing during the current crisis is 
the unusually volatile dynamic that affects the money market unsecured interest rates 
(benchmarked by the Libor and the Euribor rates) in the main financial markets. In 
normal times, the interbank market rates are strictly connected to the expected policy 
rate fixed by the Central Banks and usually lie above these rates by a constant amount 
of basis points (the risk premium).  
The strict link between the interbank rate and the policy rate is fundamental for the 
efficiency of the monetary policy, indeed the 3 (or 6) months interbank market rates are 
the benchmark rates on which the financial institutions calculate the mortgage and loan 
rates for household and firms. If these rates are strictly connected in a constant fashion 
to the key policy rates, a change in the later will be fully transferred to the former and 
through these to the credit rates on mortgages and loans and more generally to the real 
economy. However, if this condition does not hold and the spread between the interbank 
rates and the expected key policy rates (later on the “Spread”) is not constant but is a 
function of some market variables that conventional instruments of the Central Banks 
cannot influence, the monetary policy effectiveness is mined. This is unfortunately 
exactly what happens during the current crisis. 
Thus it becomes extremely important to understand: (i) which variables are actually 
affecting the spread during this period, and (ii) weather the new actions Central Banks 
implemented have produced some results. 
In this paper we investigate the two above issues and in particular we concentrate on the 
interrelation between the collateralized money markets and the unsecured money 
market: the interbank market. The main reason in fact for the interbank market rate to 
raise largely above the monetary policy rates is the tension between demand and supply 
of liquidity of short-term funding. If the supply falls short of the demand the price will 
tend to go up, above the Central Bank rate. Under normal condition, if there are these 
liquidity tensions the Central Bank injects liquidity in the money market through its 
Open Market Operations (OMOs), rising the supply of money and steering the money 
market rate back down to the key monetary policy rate. However, since during the 
current crisis the Central Banks were quite ineffective in doing so, we should 
investigate what kind of liquidity tensions the market experienced and why the injection 
of central money was unable to calm down this tension.  
 3 
The answer to this question can be found investigating (i) the structural framework of 
the money market, (ii) the reasons behind financial institutions demand in the different 
segments of the money market during the last 4-5 years and (iii) the tools the Central 
Banks hold to act in the money market. 
Another important aspect that needs to be considered is that the Spread is not affected 
only by the liquidity tensions but also by the credit risk as highlighted by Taylor and 
Williams (2009). Indeed the 3 months bank loans benchmarked by the Euribor/Libor 
rates have a higher credit risk attached then an overnight loans benchmarked by the 
Eonia/Overnight Libor. Credit risk that arises from the probability that the bank in 3 
months defaults and therefore would be not able to pay back the loan. 
The last issue we investigate in this paper is whether the Central Banks and Government 
intervention policies were able to affect the Spread. 
In the paper we present some indicator of these notional variable of liquidity tension, 
credit risk and policy intervention and we investigate which one of them are empirically 
able to explain the Spread dynamic during the current crisis.  
From the theoretical point of view our reading of the crisis feet into the well-known 
analytical framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983, 2000) bank run model, the 
Fisherian debt-deflation model and the Bernanke and Gertler (1995, 1996) and 
Holmstrom and Tirol (1997) financial accelerator model. Moreover, our investigation of 
the crisis is also in line with Brunnermeier (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2010, 2011). 
On one hand this paper follows the main literature on the topic (Taylor and Williams 
2009, McAndrews, Asani and Wang 2008, Michaud and Upper 2008, Wu 2008 among 
others) that tries to disentangle the liquidity and the credit risk effect on the spread and 
investigate if the policy intervention can be effective in take it down. On the other hand 
it uses different indicators for the liquidity and credit risk in line with the Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983, 2000) bank run model theoretical framework.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical 
framework behind the liquidity tension. In section 2 we discuss major money market 
events during the Subprime crisis period, in section 3 we present the data modelling 
approach and the results. In section 4 we conclude.  
 
1. Money market dynamic and liquidity tension during the Subprime 
crisis. 
 
 
The unsecured money market, both for the USDollar and the Euro, is a really important 
segment for the overall economy because the 3 and 6 months Euribor and Libor are the 
benchmark rates used by the financial sector to calculate the household and firms’ loans 
rate. But although the great importance given to these rates the term segment of the 
unsecured money market is a really thin market. 
The actual amount of the overall outstanding contract in the unsecured market is not 
available; therefore, it is almost impossible to know exactly the total amount of the term 
unsecured segment either. The 2007 ECB money market study reports that more than 
90% of the overall transaction have a “less than 1 week” maturity and probably also the 
other 10% is concentrated to “less than one month” maturities.1  
From this evidence we can argue that longer-term part of the market (i.e. say “more than 
1 month” maturities) should be really thin and have the role of clearing the residual 
                                                 
1 These results even strengthened during the crisis period. 
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amount of liquidity demand that arises in other segments of the money market and of 
the financial sector rather than the role of financing the bulk of the financial system 
liquidity demand. 
On the other hand the short-term securities market, represented by the Commercial 
Papers (CPs) and the Asset Backed Commercial Papers (ABCPs), has a longer maturity 
distribution and a completely different role. 
The average maturity of the CDs, the CPs and the ABCPs is 30 days and there is quite a 
good presence of securities with longer maturities as well. Therefore, the bulk of the 
term liquidity is raised in this market. The reason of this is that the unsecured market is 
mainly a market between banks, while the market of securities is a market where 
investors have a prominent participation. 
Under this framework we have that if a segment of the short-term securities market will 
freeze up, then the unsecured interbank market alone cannot tune all the short term 
liquidity demand. Indeed the shock creates a higher liquidity demand of the entire bank 
system and it cannot be supplied by the agents inside the system itself. There must be an 
infusion of liquidity through other money market segments (i.e. the Central Banks Open 
Market Operations or rising volumes in other securities issued). If this does not happen, 
the un-supplied liquidity demand of the agents holds and the price of the unsecured 
interbank loans must rise.  
Thus, a good indicator for the liquidity tensions in the interbank money market is the 
dynamic in the short-term securities markets. 
Searching for a market variables reflecting the first aspect, a perfect one is the 
outstanding volumes of papers issued by banks in the short-term securities market, in 
particular CDs, the CPs and the ABCPs. Many can argue that we are watching the 
picture upside down because actually the Euribor/Libor rates are those which influence 
the CDs, CPs and ABCPs’ outstanding volumes, via the influence they have on the 
CDs, CPs and ABCPs’ rates. However, if under normal conditions this is absolutely 
true, when there is a shock in one of those securities market the relationship is inverted 
because the crisis creates a systemic need of liquidity in the banking system. 
A shock in the the short-term securities market is amplified by two main features that 
characterized the modern investment banking system: the use of leverage debt and the 
shortening of the maturity structure in the capital market. The first phenomenon was 
over-pushed in the later years.  
Under these conditions usually the financial system can perform really well if 
everything goes in the right way, but there is an elevate risk that, if something goes 
wrong, the possible losses can be enormous and the financial crisis can be inevitable.  
The shortening of the debt maturity structure was a really common phenomenon as 
well. Over the years the financial sector tended to finance an increasing part of its assets 
with short-term borrowing in the money market.  
In particular, banks prefer to finance the long term assets, rolling over short term loans 
in the money market rather than using long term contracts in the capital market. With 
this technique, on one hand, they have both a lower cost of debt (usually short-term debt  
is cheaper) and more “windows” in which they can resell the assets (gaining from 
secondary market movements) but, on the other hand, they face an increased liquidity 
risk, since they are not sure they can roll over the short-term refinancing every time.  
In line with the traditional Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank run model, banks have 
created a large liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities that exposes them to a 
bank run. During the Subprime crisis, the run won’t be caused by the depositors (like in 
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the commercial bank model) but it is caused by the lenders in the money market. If they 
believe that the solvability of the bank is compromised, they won’t roll over the short-
term loan pushing the banks in a crisis of liquidity.  
The financial system can raise leverage debt in the money market in three main ways: 
(i) secured transactions, (ii) unsecured transactions and (iii) securitisation. 
The first way is the safer and the cheapest one, but it entails that the bank uses high 
quality assets as collateral on the loan. The bigger part of the money market secured 
transactions are General Collateral (GC) repos2. Also other high rating assets can be 
used in secured transaction but, to our knowledge, there is no information on the kind of 
assets usually exchanged. 
Also the Central banks’ OMOs are secured transaction that can be used to increase 
leverage debt. However the collaterals eligible for these repos are wider then in the 
former case. The FED before the 2007 crisis accepts only Treasury Bonds, the ECB 
accepts all marketable debt instruments in addiction to Treasury Bonds, like Covered 
and not Covered Bank Bonds, Corporate Bonds and ABS with the only restriction 
(before the crisis) that they must have a low default risk (i.e. at least Rating A). 
Another way to increase the leverage on the money market is using the securitisation 
process based on ABCP programs. ABCPs are a sort of collateralised CP, where the CP 
is backed by the cash flow deriving by different kinds of receivables (such as mortgage 
and consumer debt receivables, auto and equipment loans and leases) or others ABSs 
(such as CDOs, squared CDOs, MBSs, etc.). 
The second way through which the financial system can increase its leverage in the 
money market is the unsecured transactions. In this case the bank borrows unsecured 
and invest this liquidity in any kind of asset. Unsecured landing capacity does not 
depend on the collateral quality, but is strictly correlated to the bank’s ability to be 
solvent. 
The process behind the rise in leverage positions using secured debt is almost the same 
in all markets (GC repo, ECB’s OMO and ABCP) and it consists in buying assets and 
then using them as collateral to obtain more money to buy other assets.  
Finally, although in the unsecured market the bank does not have to use collateral, also 
in this market the process is the same: the bank will go and ask liquidity to buy assets 
and each time it has to roll over the position in order to maintain its leverage. 
The different kind of assets tends to be financed in different segments of the money 
market. If a bank has to maintain a leverage on Treasury it uses the GC repo market and 
the ECB’s OMOs (it is cheaper than other money market segments), if it has to maintain 
the leverage in the ABS market it borrows in the ABCP market and finally, if it has to 
maintain the leverage in junk risky assets (rating lower than A) it uses and roll over 
positions in the unsecured market.  
The more a financial system is leveraged, the more the Central banks are ineffective to 
provide the liquidity needed in presence of a liquidity crisis. 
This effect comes from two pathologies (which affected the financial system during the 
last years): (i) the assets price deflation and (ii) the bank run in the money market. If 
those conditions hold together in presence of high leverage there is a high probability 
that the Central Banks are unable to give to the system the right amount of liquidity it 
needs with their ordinary tools (liquidity against collateral) because banks are not 
holding the high quality collateral needed to borrow from the Central Bank.  
                                                 
2 A GC repo which are agreement between two parties whereby one party sells the other a Treasury Bond at a 
specified price with a commitment to buy the security back at a later date for another specified price 
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If there is an asset deflation in all the segments, and the Central Bank could not provide 
the necessary support, one possible solution is to find additional liquidity in the 
unsecured segment of the money market. In this market collaterals are not binding and 
the bank can raise the liquidity it needs.  
This means that the financial system possible asset deflation can be rolled over in the 
money market only with the unsecured segment (Euribor-Libor markets), while neither 
the GC repo market nor the ECB’s OMOs can have this purpose. 
All the trouble in the money market and in the financial system started to materialise 
when the ABCP market froze up.  
In a ABCP program, as other securitisation transaction, a sponsor bank creates a Special 
Investment Vehicle (SIV) which has the purpose to purchase receivables, CDOs and 
other ABS from the sponsor bank and rise liquidity in the capital market using the cash 
flow deriving from these ABS.  
Under these conditions, when during the first part of the 2007, the US Subprime 
mortgage market deteriorated, the investors became the more in more worried by the 
solvability of many ABCP program backed by those mortgages and by CDOs built on 
those mortgages.  
All the ABCP programs not fully supported started to be run by investors, worried 
about the possibility of losing a part or all their money. 
The banks, after taking on their balance sheet the program’s assets, must now roll the 
ABS used as collateral in the run ABCP programs in other market (short-term or long 
term) and they also have to find out the liquidity needed to cover the difference between 
the market value of the not-run ABCP programs and the market value of the ABS used 
as collateral. From a systemic point of view the total amount of liquidity needed by a 
high leveraged financial system is equal to the decreased amount of outstanding volume 
of the ABCP programs. This liquidity can also be viewed as the rise in liquidity demand 
in other money market segments. 
Only the A-rating ABS can be rolled at the Central Banks3 and just the depositary 
institution can participate at the OMOs.  
A large part of this liquidity demand had to be covered in the unsecured money market 
(Euribor/Libor segments). Moreover, since the ABCP programs subject to run were 
those with riskier assets in their balance sheet, the big part of the collateral that are no 
more financed are those not eligible at the central banks’ OMO but which has to be 
financed with unsecured debt. The huge demand of liquidity at the aggregate level 
pushed higher the interbank rates.  
 
2. A Model for the interbank rate 
 
The money market rates can be decomposed into several factors that reflect the 
characteristics of the borrowing banks as well as market wise conditions. As a 
consequence, the consensus in the literature is that the interbank rate can be affected by 
the following variables: (i) Expectations on the monetary policy in the next three 
months, (ii) Credit risk attached to the unsecured landing, (iii) Liquidity tension present 
in the market and (iv) Central Banks ad hoc interventions. The liquidity risk is 
                                                 
3 Note that at the very beginning of the crisis the FED and the BOE did not have this facility, but they had to 
introduce it as long as they wanted to sustain at list a part of this liquidity demand. 
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represented by the funding liquidity needs of the borrowing. The credit or counterparty 
risk is the compensation for the risk of default of the borrowing bank. 
The model is represented as: 
(1) ,( ( ); ; ; ) t f t t t tIR f Exp R C L CBI=  
where IR is the Interbank rate, )( ,tfRExp  is the expectation at time t of the monetary 
policy reference rate after n months., CBI is the group of several indicators of policy 
interventions, C is our variable of credit risk and L the one for the liquidity tensions.  
To take out the pure expectation effects on the 3 months Euribor rate we need a market 
variable which can reflect the market expectation about future monetary policy. A good 
candidate is the three months Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS), also called Eonia swap 
for the European money market. This rate is closely connected to the average overnight 
interest rate expected to prevail over the next three months, since is the rate at which 
banks swap overnight rate (Eonia) at three months maturity.  
Under these conditions, we can clear the expectation effects on the 3 months Euribor 
using the three months OIS. 
The 3 months Libor-OIS or Euribor-OIS spreads will thus reflect the components of the 
unsecured rate which is affected just by liquidity risk, credit risk and Central Banks 
Interventions. That is: 
(2) ( ; ; ) t t t tSpread f C L CBI=  
Thus, we have to focus on the role of the three left variables had taken to this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
2.1 Liquidity risk indicators (Lt) 
Our analysis suggests that indicators for the liquidity tension phenomenon described 
above are the market liquidity conditions in the different segments of the money 
markets. Data on market liquidity conditions are not easily available. The only data that 
fit to our purposes are CPs and ABCPs’ outstanding volumes, for three main reasons. 
First, because the main source of the current turmoil in the money market is the ABCP 
market. Second, if the liquidity demand is due to a run and asset deflation in the low 
rating securitised segment (ABCP for example) the losses must be adsorbed in the 
unsecured segment (the Euribor/Libor market and CPs markets). Third, the outstanding 
volumes can reflect both the bank run phenomenon and the asset deflation phenomenon 
(if the lenders does not run, the short term debt volume decreases just in the amount of 
the collateral assets deflation, if the lenders run the volume decreases of all the amount 
of the loan). 
In line with Bruneirmeier and Pedersen (2008), a second indicator for funding and 
market liquidity is the volatility. The intuition is that since liquidity risk tends to 
increase price volatility, and since an uninformed financier may interpret price volatility 
as fundamental volatility, this increases margins and margin calls. Indeed if there are 
more volatility in the market prices also the margin calls on feature and derivative 
contracts will be pushed up, putting additional pressure on the financial institutions’ 
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liquidity demand. Therefore, a second indicator for liquidity risk is VIX: the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. 
 
 
2.2 Credit risk indicators (Ct) 
The Euribor/Libor transactions are unsecured transactions between banks. Therefore, 
the price of those transactions has to entails a credit risk premium. The higher is the risk 
of a banks’ default the larger is the price on unsecured loans. A commonly used 
indicator for the financial institutions’ credit risk is the Credit Default Swap index for 
the financial sector. In our analysis we use the CDS Index for the United States for both 
the Euribor and the Libor markets. 
A second variable that is also related to credit risk is volatility. In fact, an increase in the 
volatility in the equity market increases the probability of defaults and reduces the bond 
prices and therefore increases the bond yield and the credit spread.  
The VIX, can thus became another measure of the credit risk that can affect the Spread 
in the short-term. 
 
 
2.3 Indicators for Central Banks interventions (CBIt) 
We consider the indicators for Central Banks interventions by summarizing the analysis 
done in Casarin, Sartore and Zabotto (2012), where some suggestions to reconstruct 
measures of the ECB and the FED liquidity injection variables are given. 
 
2.3.1. The ECB’s intervention policy 
ECB reacts to the financial crisis with two categories of measures: actions toward the 
interventions on the interest rate, called “standard measures” and the “enhanced credit 
support”, called “non standard". 
In a condition of liquidity scarcity, the refinancing (REFI) rate is a good instrument to 
act in the interbank rate because of their sensitivity to the REFI fluctuations 
 
Inside the “enhanced credit support” special program we focus on ECB refinancing 
operations with different maturities. We consider two types of refinancing operation: 
LTROs and MROs; both of them are open market operations (OMOs) but with a 
different duration. LTROs and MROs stand for long-term liquidity and short-term 
liquidity respectively. Before the crisis there were only two ways of refinancing 
operations: MROs with a one-week maturity and LTROs with a three-month maturity. 
During the crisis, ECB modified the refinancing operations features increasing the 
frequency of LTROs and introducing new LTROs with one-month, six-month and 
twelve-month maturities. The ECB provided huge amounts of liquidity to the banking 
system through both regular and special OMOs; first of all, it increased the allotted 
amount to meet liquidity needs via MROs and LTROs. In front of the strong demand for 
liquidity, ECB used fixed-rate tenders with full allotment with the aim of satisfying 
bank’s liquidity need in its entirety. Furthermore, the Central Bank introduced very long 
LTROs with one-year maturity. 
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All the amounts both in LTROs and in MROs are distributed through working days 
among tenders and through the maturity of the operation4. 
 
For both LTROs and MROs analysis we consider the variables: 
− Bid amount; represents the liquidity need of the ECB’s counterparts; it is the 
amount that the counterparts offer as a guarantee of the allotment received 
through LTROs. 
− Number of bidders; is the number of subjects that benefit from the use of 
liquidity issued by the ECB at a certain instant. 
− Allotted amount; is the quantity of money in circulation due to the ECB 
monetary policy. 
− Satisfaction rate; gives information about the percentage of satisfaction given by 
the ECB to the counterparts bids. 
 
2.3.2. The Federal Reserve intervention policies 
Likewise to the European Central Bank, FED as well reacted to the crisis going beyond 
the cutting of the federal funds target rate. It implemented a number of programs with 
the aim of supporting the financial institutions liquidity and improving the conditions in 
the financial markets. 
Regarding the FED reference rate, it is well known that the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) adjusts the rate in its regular meetings but it can also be adjusted in 
emergency meetings. The Federal Funds Target Rate passed from 5-1/4 percent in 2006 
to actually zero at the end of 2008. 
Other peculiar actions implemented by FED during the financial turmoil can be divided 
in three groups. 
The first group of programs consists of a short-term liquidity supply addressed to banks, 
depository institutions and financial institutions. This group includes: 
− the traditional discount window; 
− TAF, Term Auction Facility; established in December 2007 to meet the demands for 
term funding more directly than the discount window, considered by many banks as 
a signal of financial weakness. 
− PDCF, Primary Dealer Credit Facility; established in March 2008 in response to 
the tensions in the tripartite repurchase agreement market. The PDCF consists of an 
overnight loan facility for primary dealers and it functions similarly to the FED 
discount window for depository institutions. 
− TSLF, Term Securities Lending Facility; established by the FED in March 2008 to 
approach the pressure faced by primary dealers in their access to term funding and 
collaterals. Under this program, the FED loaned liquid Treasury securities to 
primary dealers with a fee for one month in exchange for eligible collateral, 
including also less liquid securities. Loans were allocated through auctions. 
                                                 
4 Details for the computations of the indicators are reported on Casarin, Sartore and Zabotto (2012). 
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The second group of actions implies the supply of liquidity directly to borrowers and 
investors in the credit market. This category consists of: 
− CPFF, Commercial Paper Funding Facility; established by the FED in October 
2008 in order to address the strains in the commercial paper market. With this 
facility, FED provided liquidity to US issuers of commercial paper when that credit 
was not available in the market. 
− AMLF, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility; introduced in September 2008 to help Money Market Mutual Funds 
(MMMFs), that held ABCP to meet investors’ demands for redemptions and to 
support liquidity in the ABCP market and, more generally, in the money market.  
− MMIFF, Money Market Investor Funding Facility; a supplement to the AMLF 
introduced in October 2008 and it had the similar purpose of increasing the liquidity 
available to MMMFs. 
− TALF, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility; introduced by FED in 
November 2008, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Treasury, with the 
purpose of stimulating the issue of securities backed by privately originated loans to 
consumers and business and of improving market conditions for ABS. 
A third group of instruments includes: 
− Purchase of long-term securities for the Federal Reserve portfolio in order to 
support the functioning of credit market. 
All these programs were established by the FED under the Authority of the Federal 
Reserve Act in order to provide liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in the 
credit market; some of the programs ran for a short-medium period and stopped when 
the conditions in the financial markets have improved5.  
Data are available with different information not only compared with the ECB data but 
also with the FED facilities. To compare the two CBs liquidity injections, for FED data 
we consider the same variables used in ECB case: Bid amount, Number of bidders, 
Allotted amount and Satisfaction rate. 
In our regression analysis we avoid to use the Bid amounts and the Numbers of bidders 
as variables because they are collinear or quasi-collinear to the allotted amounts.  
 
3. Modelling the 3 months Euribor (Libor) Spread 
3.1 Variables and descriptive statistics 
The sample period considered is from January 18, 2006 to January 12, 2011. 
Consequently, for each observable or computed variable we have 261 weekly data that 
correspond exactly to 5 years. In January 2011 we can consider ended the Subprime 
crisis, even though the financial crisis has continued as Sovereign crisis. 
 
Figure 3.1.1 plots the spread between the 3 month Euribor and the Eonia swap and the 
spread between the Libor and the OIS in dollar. The picture seems quite the same for 
both currencies and similar pattern can be found also in the spread in sterling pounds 
and yen. 
                                                 
5 On 30th October 2009, MMIFF expired; subsequently, on 1st February 2010, AMLF, CPFF, PDCF and TSLF were 
closed while the final TAF was affected on 8th March 2010. 
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[Insert Figure 3.1.1]  
 
Before the crisis there was a constant spread between the expected central bank rate and 
the unsecured money market rate. With the crisis this spread widens up and became 
quite volatile. Sample data show the crisis jump at the second week of August 2007. 
In the analysis we presented above we identify three main groups of variables that can 
affect the spread dynamic: the liquidity risk variables, the credit risk variables and the 
Central Bank intervention variables. 
In the previous section 2.3 we have done a wide description of the CBI (Central Banks 
Intervention) variables. Here we give some brief description of the liquidity and credit 
risk variables that is of the volume on the Commercial Paper markets, VIX, CDS. 
The volume of the Commercial Papers market is characterized in our analysis by the 
ABCP outstanding volumes and the volumes of Commercial Paper issued by financial 
institutions (FCP). Data are from the weekly FED release. As the results shows later, 
they incorporate enough information to well explain the liquidity tensions dynamic6.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.1.2] 
 
The other variables we use are the VIX and the Credit Default Swap Index for the US 
financial sector (CDS). The weekly series of these variables are calculated using daily 
data as average of the 4 working days before Wednesday and Wednesday itself. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.1.3] and [Insert Figure 3.1.4] 
 
As stressed above, the explanatory variables we use are the same among the two 
markets (Euribor and Libor), since they are indicators of market phenomenon (such as 
assets deflation, bank run, liquidity tensions, rising counterparty risk) which are 
common to both the markets. 
As Figures 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 show, during the beginning of August when the 
Subprime crisis exploded the Spread, the CPs outstanding volumes and the VIX 
experienced all a sharp departure from their historical trends. The VIX and the Spread 
increased suddenly both in the constant value and in the volatility, while the CP had the 
inverse behaviors. The CDS increases more constantly during the financial crisis period, 
while it exploded only during March 2008 with the collapse of Bear Stern. 
Table 3.1.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables we considered along with 
their logarithmic transformation. As shown, the log transformation reduces the values of 
the Jarque-Bera test. The probabilities of the tests show that we are far from the 
acceptance of normality hypothesis; nevertheless, the gain towards normality is 
substantial for many variables. For this reason the log transformation of the variables 
are considered in the regression models. The ADF test statistic indicates that each 
variable has a unit root in either panels thus we must be careful when we estimate our 
model with the OLS; indeed we have to avoid possible spurious regressions. 
                                                 
6 We use weekly data, because the FED makes public the Commercial Paper release each Wednesday. 
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[Insert Table 3.1.1] and [Insert Table 3.1.2] 
 
 
3.2. Regression Analysis 
We follow the Engle-Granger two-step estimation approach. In the first step, we 
estimate our model using the level of the variables (even if they are integrated of order 
one) and then check the residuals. The static model has the form: 
(3) 
1
m
t i it t
i
y c x uγ
=
= + +∑  
where ty  interprets the Spread variable, { }, 1, ,itx i m=   are the explanatory variables, 
and tu  the error term. 
If we reject the presence of unit roots on the residual series ˆtu , then there is a consistent 
long-run relationship between the variables, because the variables which enter in the 
long-run regression are cointegrated. More specifically, in this case the OLS estimators 
of the long-run coefficients { }, 1, ,i i mγ =   are super-consistent and we use the 
residuals as a computed regression variable (the ECM component) in the second step 
where we estimate the short-run regression in ECM form.  
Looking at the spread behavior, an important remark regards the possibility to insert a 
dummy variable at the beginning of August 2007 in coincidence with the explosion of 
the financial subprime financial crisis. From econometric point of view this rapid 
upward behaviour and change of volatility could be considered as a structural break that 
can be modeled in various ways. We can use a step dummy or a switching regime 
model or something else. Those methods lead to a better fit of the regression equations 
due to insertion of more parameters that increase the flexibility of the models. In 
opposition to this advantage, a less good aspect is the difficult interpretation of the 
estimated parameters of the model. Often the insertion of dummies or more parameters 
compensates for absence of omitted and (unfortunately) unobservable explanatory 
variables that become more relevant in the transition, that is, pre and post the breaking 
period. Moreover, in the same transition period it might partially hide the contribution 
of the other variables which are actually inserted in the equations and might act as good 
proxies of the ones unobservable and omitted. 
For this reason we exclude the use of dummies in this contest and we leave to the risk 
variable to explain entirely their contribution to the spread. 
The results for the first step are reported in Table 3.2.1a and Table 3.2.1b respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 3.2.1a] and [Insert Table 3.2.1b] 
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The ADF tests on the residual series reject the hypothesis of the presence of unit roots: 
the value of the ADF statistic is 4.436−  for Euribor ECM component and 4.810− for 
Libor ECM component. Both the computed values define a critical region which 
contains the test statistic variable with a probability very near zero. Consequently, the 
coefficient estimates can be interpreted as long-run coefficients. 
Regarding Euribor-Eonia spread, we can underline that all the expected signs of the 
explanatory variables are fulfilled and the relative importance of the impacts on the 
spread is given by the CDS and CP variables. 
The link between the Spread and the CDS is positive as expected: if the banking sector 
is facing an increase of the probability of default, the spread will be higher. The 
relationship between Spread and CP volume is negative and also economically 
significant as expected in line with the arguments presented in Section 2. This is another 
relevant variable and indicates that tension on the CP markets and the dry-up of one 
segments of this market: the ABCP, has produced a huge demand of liquidity in the 
interbank market as well as the large losses that has increased the Spread. The results 
for VIX confirm its ability to capture liquidity and market risk as well as credit risk. 
More specifically, a change of 1% of the CDS value has an increasing impact of 0.6% 
in the Euribor-Eonia spread. Regarding the volume of CP, again we observe that an 
increase of 1% has a reduction impact of 2.5% of the Euribor-Eonia spread. A reduction 
of 1% of VIX contributes to a smaller spread of 0.4%. These results highlights the 
importance of liquidity risk variables like the CP volumes in explaining the long-run 
dynamics of the spread, an aspect so far ignored by the previous empirical literature. 
Concerning the liquidity injection variables, the most important are ECB_REFI_RATE 
that reduces the spread of an amount a bit over the 7% if it decreases of 25 basis points 
and ALLOTTED_LTRO, which affects the spread of −0.2% per 1 billion Euros 
increment. The other intervention variables have minor effects but not irrelevant7. 
 
The Figure 3.2.1a reports the long-run curves, i.e. the estimation of the expected values 
of spreads given the explanatory risk and CBI variables. The figure shows that the fitted 
long-run curve of the Euribor-Eonia Spread has a jump corresponding to the inception 
of the sub-prime financial crisis in August 2007. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.2.1a] 
 
Table 3.2.1b shows that the prominent variable that influences the Libor-OIS spread is 
CDS and CP followed by the intervention variables ALLOTTED_TAF and 
SAT_RATE_TALF. The wrong sign appears only for SAT_RATE_TSLF, which seems 
to have an opposite compensating effect with respect to SAT_RATE_TALF. 
                                                 
7 Measuring the changes in standard deviation units rather than natural or percentage terms, 1% increasing value of 
CDS has an increasing impact of 0.73% in the Euribor-Eonia spread and 1% increasing in the volume of CP entails 
a reduction impact of 0.59%. Smaller volatility of 1% reduces the spread of 0.16%. Similarly, ECB_REFI_RATE 
reduces the spread of 0.33% if it decreases of 1% standard unit and ALLOTTED_LTRO affects the spread of -
0.44% per 1% increment. 
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The economic impact of a change of 1% of CDS in this case has an impact of 0.83% in 
the Libor-OIS spread that is we observe a relationship near one to one between the 
Libor-OIS spread and the CDS spread. Regarding the CP, a change of 1% the effect is a 
reduction of 1.53% of the Libor-OIS spread. A reduction of 1% of VIX contributes to a 
smaller spread of 0.56%. 
With reference to the liquidity injection variables, a relevant role is played by 
ALLOTTED_TALF: its increase of 1 billion dollars affects the spread of −2.71%. Also 
ALLOTTED_TAF and SAT_RATE_TSLF have good long-run impacts on the spread. 
The values are respectively of −0.18% per 1 billion dollars and of −0.93% per 1% 
increment of satisfaction rate. The other intervention variables have minor effects but 
not irrelevant8. 
A particular consideration should be done for the FED_FUNDS_TARGET_RATE. Its 
long-run impact is not statistically significant. The low relevance of the FED reference 
rate is consistent with the FED monetary policy, i.e. with its choice to keep the 
reference rate at the floor. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.2.1b] 
 
Notice that not every intervention variables affect the spread in the long-run. If we use 
the AIC criterion for the selection of the significant regression coefficients, then 
ALLOTTED_MRO, BID_MRO, NBIDDERS_LTRO and SAT_RATE_LTRO do not 
contribute to reduce the difference between Euribor and Eonia (in the reduced static 
model 8m = ). 
This result should not surprise, most of the intervention variables have similar 
description of the CB reaction to control the liquidity in the financial sector and the 
regression analysis selects the ones more appropriate among them inside the sample 
period. Nothing to say, the excluded variables from the long-run regression could affect 
the spread in the short-run. 
The short-run regression assumes the ECM form: 
(4) 
11
1
1 1 0
ˆ
j
t i t i ij jt i t t
i j i
qmp
y c y x uα β λ ε
−−
∗ ∗
− − −
= = =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + +∑ ∑∑  
where 1p −  and { }1, 1, ,jq j m− =   are the minimum lag orders to assure that tε  can 
be supposed a white noise error term and ˆtu  represents the ECM component. The 
                                                 
8 Measuring the changes in standard deviation units rather than natural or percentage terms, 1% increasing value of 
CDS has an increasing impact of 1% in the Libor-OIS spread, that is, we observe a one to one relationship between 
the Libor-OIS spread and the CDS spread. Regarding the CP, a change of 1% the effect is a reduction of 0.36% of 
the Libor-OIS spread. Smaller volatility of 1% reduces the spread of 0.23%. 
 With reference to the liquidity injection variables, ALLOTTED_TALF increment of 1% affects the spread of 
−0.75%. Also ALLOTTED_TAF and SAT_RATE_TSLF have good long-run impacts on the spread respectively of 
−0.34% and −0.30%. 
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stability condition of the ECM model is satisfied if the parameter λ  is inside the 
negative open interval ( 2,0)− . 
In the short-run regression we use again the AIC criterion, firstly for deciding the 
minimum lag orders mentioned above, subsequently for the regressors selection. For 
Euribor, AIC criterion agrees with the other information criteria of Schwarz and 
Hannan-Quinn: the choice is in favor of lag 1. A diverse result we obtain for Libor 
Spread: the Akaike criterion, differently from the other criteria, has two relative 
minimum values at -1.292 (lag 4) and -1.307 (lag 1). A prudential choice suggests 
considering the general dynamic model with four lags for the Libor Spread9.  
The results of the specifications of the regressions, using the 'general to specific' 
modelling method, are shown in Table 3.2.2a and Table 3.2.2b. 
 
[Insert Table 3.2.2a] 
 
[Insert Table 3.2.2b] 
 
As the tables show, the dynamic is driven mainly by the lagged dependent variable and 
by ECM component. The autoregressive component explains the positive inertia of 
spread movements and the discrepancies between the expected and actual spread play 
the most relevant role for the short-run curve. Furthermore, the intercept is highly not 
significant: the evidence of zero intercept in presence of unit roots in levels leads to the 
exclusion of deterministic trends in the spread series. 
The R-squared of the regression is low at 0.27 for Euribor Spread and 0.44 for Libor 
Spread. This is due to the high value of total variance explained by the long-run curve 
(91.3% and 90.9% respectively) and it is also the consequence of stationarity of the 
differenced dependent variable. Anyway, it should be underlined that the short-run 
curve adds an incremental contribution of 7.8 R-squared units in explaining the total 
variance of the spread, therefore the long-run curve and the short-run curve together 
reach the 99.1%. Similarly the incremental contribution of the short-run curve in the 
case of Libor Spread is of 8.2 R-squared units. 
The residuals are not autocorrelated and not even heteroskedastic for the Euribor 
Spread. Some problems arise with the deviation from the normality. The empirical 
distribution appears positively skewed and with a large excess of kurtosis. The 
explanation of this deviation is almost entirely given by the jump of residuals at the 
beginning of the financial crisis that happened unexpectedly at the second week of 
August 2007 (8/08/2007 in our sample). In fact, if we insert an impulse dummy at this 
date, then we have a substantial reduction of the skewness (from 1.96 to -0.21) and 
kurtosis (from 21.60 to 5.33). On the contrary, the Libor Spread residuals are 
                                                 
9 Results are provided upon request. 
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characterized by the presence of light heterosckedasticity which cannot be reduced 
using dummies10. 
 
3.3 The impulse response functions 
It is well known that the model (3) and (4) can be written in ADL form: 
(5) 
1 1 0
jqp m
t i t i ij jt i t
i j i
y c y xα β ε− −
= = =
= + + +∑ ∑∑  
or: 
(6) 
0
( ) ( )
m
t j jt t
j
L y c L xα β ε
=
= + +∑  
where L is the lag operator, 1( ) 1 ppL L Lα α α= − − −  and 
0 1 ,( ) , 1, ,jj
q
j j q jL L L j mβ β β β= + + + =  . 
 
The parameters α  and β  can be easily computed from the parameters of the static 
equation (3) and ECM form (4) by using the following relations: 
 
(7)   
0
*
1 1
* *
1
*
1
1
1 (1)
, 2, , 1i i i
p p
i p
α
α α α
α α α
α α
−
−
=

= − +

= − = −
 = −

 
 
*
0 0
* *
1 1 0
* *
1
*
1
(1)
, 2, , 1
1, ,
j j
j j j
ij ij i j
q q
i q
j m
β β
β α γ β β
β β β
β β
−
−
 =

 = + −
 = − = −

= −
 =


 
where  1(1) 1 pα α α= − − − . 
The corresponding final form of (6) is: 
(8) 
1 1 1
1
0
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
m
t j jt t
j
m
j jt t
j
y c L L x L
c h L x
α β α α ε
ε
− − −
=
∗
=
= + +
= ∗+ +
∑
∑
. 
where  1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) , (1) , ( )j j t th L L L c c Lβ α α ε α ε
− − ∗ −= ∗ = = . 
                                                 
10 The distribution of the residuals is provided upon request. 
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Stability conditions of the model imply that all the roots of the polynomial equation 
( ) 0Lα =  lie outside the unit circle so that the inverse polynomial 1( )Lα −  exists. If the 
stability conditions are satisfied then ,
0
( ) kj k j
k
h L h L
∞
=
= ∑  are convergent series and the 
infinite sequences of the coefficients { }, , 1, ,k jh j m=   represent the impulse response 
functions that measure the dynamic response of ty  to the unit impulses of the 
explanatory variables jtx . 
The sequences { }, , 1, ,k jh j m=   are computed on the basis of the recursive formula: 
(9) 
0, 0
, , ,
1
, ,
1
;
;
1, , ; min( , )j
j
j j
r
ik j k j k i j
i
r
ik j k i j
i
h
h h k q r k p
h h k q
β
β α
α
−
=
−
=










=
= + = =
= >
∑
∑

. 
 
In our analysis the stability conditions are implicitly satisfied by the cointegration 
property and ECM representation, therefore we can calculate the empirical response 
function for each explanatory variable. 
In the Appendix A the impulse response functions of Euribor-Eonia Spread are 
reported. The curves are computed using the formula (9). 
Considering that the coefficients ,k jh  are functions of the parameters α  and β , that is, 
, , ( , ), 1, , ; 0,1, ,k j k j i lj jh f i p l qα β= = =  , we used the algorithm based on the 
partial derivatives of the functions ,k jf  and the estimated covariance matrix of the 
model parameters to compute the exact confidence intervals at the 95% level. 
A general remark on these functions is that the unit shocks of almost all the explanatory 
variables reach their maximum effect in three periods (weeks). Exception is done for the 
CP, whose negative impact is quicker (53.8% in two weeks) and for VIX, whose 
positive shock affects smoothly the spread on the periods: 63.3% of its impact happens 
in two weeks, almost 90% in two months. We can notice the poor dynamic relevance of 
NBIDDERS_MRO variable, flattened by the wide confidence intervals. 
All the intervention variables have an impact on the spread, in term of total increment or 
decrement ( )∆ , which follows this rule: 4∆  after the first fortnight, 2∆ after 1 month 
and 3 4∆  after 2 months. Slightly faster is the reaction to the BID_LTRO and 
NBIDDERS_MRO variables. 
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The ALLOTTED_MRO and BID_MRO variables do not give any contribution in the 
long-run, but they contribute in the short-run dynamic of the spread. 
The impulse response functions on Libor-OIS spread are plotted in Appendix B. 
The behavior of these functions is almost similar to those of the Euribor-Eonia spread 
even though they are characterized by greater fluctuations along the lags, often 
alternating positive and negative signs. 
Within the credit risk indicators, CP presents an opposite behaviour compared to the 
impulse response function of Euribor-Eonia spread, but we have to consider that the 
positive pick after one week is widely compensated by the negative simultaneous 
impact and by the responses that remain on the negative territory for all the lags after 
the third week. Furthermore, we observe the same relative persistence of the impact of 
the VIX variable. 
FED_FUNDS_RATE has an immediate negative impact half-recovered after one month 
and completely after two. ALLOTTED_TAF and SAT_RATE_TAF have similar 
dynamics: two months are sufficient to drain almost completely all the negative impact 
on the spread. ALLOTTED_TSLF is faster for two weeks. Consistently with the 
unexpected positive long-run coefficient, SAT_RATE_TSLF affects the spread with a 
positive wave analogous dynamically to the CDS impact.  ALLOTTED_TALF and 
SAT_RATE_TALF perform a very slow and persistent impact on the spread: their 
effect is not completed after three months. Finally, the SAT_RATE_PDCF and 
SAT_RATE_AMLF variables do not give any contribution in the long-run, but they 
contribute in the short-run dynamic of the spread. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the collateralized short term debt market 
of the commercial papers and the unsecured interbank market during the 2007-2008 
subprime crisis. 
We find that during the crisis period the spread dynamic follows a pattern largely 
dependent on the outstanding volume of the ABCP. In particular, the paper shows that 
the ABCP and the Financial CP outstanding volumes have an inverse relationship with 
the spread.  
The most significant variable that explains the spread is the CDS index both for Euribor 
and the Libor markets, followed by CP and VIX. The last one seems to contribute more 
to the short-run dynamics than the long-run curve.  
These finding support the idea that the liquidity tension is the main cause of the huge 
jump in the Spread during the crisis period. The runs on the short-term securities market 
create an aggregate systemic liquidity need in the financial sector that obviously cannot 
be supplied by the only remaining available market: the unsecured interbank market. 
Under normal times this liquidity injections is offered by the Central Banks, but 
especially during the second part of the crisis the Central Banks were not able to 
provide the liquidity requested by the market, because also Central Banks for providing 
liquidity require a collateral. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the Spread is not affected at all neither by traditional 
Central Banks interventions (Open Market Operations where the Central Banks give 
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liquidity against high quality collateral) nor by cuts in key policy rates. However, “non-
conventional” measures do have an impact, as our analysis shows. 
In particular, for the ECB the most relevant intervention in the long-run is the REFI rate 
and the Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO allotted). For the FED in the long-
run relevant interventions are the Term Auction Facility (TAF, allotted) and the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF, allotted). The FED Fund Target Rate is 
not relevant in the long-run but it contributes to the short-run dynamic. 
The main lessons that we can learn from this analysis is that the Euribor and the Libor 
rates cannot be used any more as benchmark for other markets rates. Indeed, first, the 
Central Banks cannot efficiently control these rates with their ordinary tools but only 
with the addition of "non conventional" measures. This is particularly true when the 
Central Bank needs to control them more, i.e. during crisis. Credit risk and liquidity 
tensions in the short-term securities market make the Euribor and Libor rates dynamic 
largely unrelated to the Central Banks target rates. Therefore, the Central Banks have to 
constantly monitor the dynamic of these two variables: CDS and CP volume. 
Furthermore, if the monetary policy has to be fully transferred into real economy rates, 
changes in key central rates must be fully transferred to the benchmark rates and thus 
the later must be always attached to the former and if they don’t the Central Banks must 
be able to steer them back. Moreover, a new benchmark must be found and it must be a 
market rate of short term loans collateralised by safe assets (as the GC Eurepo for 
example). Only in this case the Central Banks could, with their ordinary tools, control it. 
However further research on the topic must be done. 
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Figures to be included in the body text 
 
Figure 3.1.1. - Euribor-OIS and Libor-OIS Spreads 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2. - Commercial Papers (CP) outstanding volumes 
 
 
Figure 3.1.3. - Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) 
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Figure 3.1.4. - Credit Default Swap Index for the US financial sector (CDS) 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2.1a - Long-run Curve of the Euribor-Eonia Spread 
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Fig. 3.2.1b - Long-run Curve of the Libor-OIS Spread 
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Table 3.1.1. Descriptive statistics of the spreads 
 
 
SPREAD 
EURIBOR 
LOG SPREAD 
EURIBOR 
SPREAD 
LIBOR 
LOG SPREAD 
LIBOR 
  
Mean  0.421099 -1.358383  0.424801 -1.466580 
 Median  0.322200 -1.132583  0.128488 -2.051920 
 Maximum  1.801200  0.588453  3.469750  1.244083 
 Minimum  0.046600 -3.066155  0.043804 -3.128030 
 Std. Dev.  0.380965  1.100925  0.524378  1.085932 
 Skewness  1.448564 -0.325190  2.523459  0.489929 
 Kurtosis  5.364027  1.757965  11.44157  1.816808 
     
 Jarque-Bera  152.0540  21.37641  1051.954  25.66569 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000023  0.000000  0.000003 
 
 
Table 3.1.2. Descriptive statistics of the credit risk variables 
 
 
CDS 
 
LOG(CDS) 
 
CP 
 
LOG(CP) 
 
VIX 
 
LOG(VIX) 
 
 Mean  0.361852 -1.686005  1.424997  0.322627  23.44088  3.052756 
 Median  0.290456 -1.236302  1.558638  0.443813  21.72200  3.078326 
 Maximum  1.434171  0.360587  1.983218  0.684721  72.78200  4.287469 
 Minimum  0.021542 -3.837733  0.890061 -0.116465  10.04400  2.306975 
 Std. Dev.  0.345343  1.344307  0.344314  0.256852  11.73749  0.437920 
 Skewness  1.075298 -0.396077 -0.200764 -0.390345  1.713184  0.464704 
 Kurtosis  3.448818  1.687203  1.582693  1.622303  6.302188  2.925272 
       
 Jarque-Bera  52.48815  25.56650  23.59856  27.26935  246.2584  9.454533 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000003  0.000008  0.000001  0.000000  0.008851 
 
 
Table 3.2.1a - Long-Run Regression of the Euribor-Eonia Spread 
                     (Dependent Variable: LOG(SPREAD_EURIBOR)) 
 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Std. Error (°) 
COSTANT  −0.590 0.715 
LOG(CDS) +    0.601*** 0.074 
LOG(CP) − −2.529*** 0.490 
LOG(VIX) +    0.402** 0.176 
ECB_REFI_RATE +    0.281*** 0.071 
ALLOTTED_LTRO − −1.962*** 0.629 
BID_LTRO +    1.232* 0.635 
NBIDDERS_MRO +    1.045*** 0.365 
SAT_RATE_MRO −  −0.012* 0.006 
      2 0.913R = , ˆ 0.330σ = , 0.653AIC =  
             (°) Newey-West Heteroskedasticity AutoCorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors 
      *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level 
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Table 3.2.1b - Long-Run Regression of the Libor-OIS Spread 
                     (Dependent Variable: LOG(SPREAD_LIBOR)) 
 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Std. Error (°) 
COSTANT      −0.888 1.053 
LOG(CDS) +     0.830*** 0.154 
LOG(CP) −  −1.530** 0.750 
LOG(VIX) +     0.560** 0.270 
FED_FUNDS_TARGET_RATE +     0.157 0.129 
ALLOTTED_TAF −   −1.841*** 0.521 
ALLOTTED_TALF − −27.435*** 6.522 
ALLOTTED_TSLF −   −0.321* 0.168 
SAT_RATE_TAF −   −0.004* 0.002 
SAT_RATE_TALF −   −0.005*** 0.002 
SAT_RATE_TSLF −      0.009*** 0.002 
   2 0.909R = , ˆ 0.334σ = , 0.686AIC =  
     (°) Newey-West Heteroskedasticity AutoCorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors 
  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level 
 
 
Table 3.2.2a - Short-Run Regression of the Euribor-Eonia Spread 
                      (Dependent Variable: ∆LOG(SPREAD_EURIBOR) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error (°) 
COSTANT    0.003 0.007 
∆LOG(SPREAD_EURIBOR(−1))    0.376*** 0.131 
∆LOG(CP(−1))  −0.693* 0.356 
∆LOG(VIX)    0.227** 0.104 
∆ALLOTTED_MRO    1.256** 0.605 
∆ALLOTTED_MRO(−1)  −0.338* 0.197 
∆BID_MRO  −0.902** 0.449 
∆SAT_RATE_MRO  −0.005** 0.002 
ECM_EURIBOR(−1)  −0.125*** 0.042 
   2 0.268R = , ˆ 0.112σ = , 1.507AIC = −  
    (°) Newey-West Heteroskedasticity AutoCorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors 
   *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level 
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Table 3.2.2b - Short-Run Regression of the Libor-OIS Spread 
                      (Dependent Variable: ∆LOG(SPREAD_LIBOR) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error (°) 
  COSTANT     0.0043 0.00791 
∆LOG(SPREAD_LIBOR(−1))     0.2782** 0.13308 
∆LOG(SPREAD_LIBOR(−3))     0.1824*** 0.06496 
∆LOG(CP)   −0.9247** 0.55415 
∆LOG(CP(−2))     1.2000** 0.55026 
∆LOG(VIX)     0.2856** 0.11532 
∆LOG(VIX(−2))     0.1476 0.11487 
∆LOG(VIX(−3))     0.1756*** 0.06562 
∆FED_FUNDS_TARGET_RATE(−1)   −0.1355* 0.07194 
∆FED_FUNDS_TARGET_RATE(−2)   −0.1733*** 0.06551 
∆ALLOTTED_TAF(−2)   −0.4607*** 0.16520 
∆ALLOTTED_TAF(−3))   −0.4756*** 0.15563 
∆ALLOTTED_TALF) −16.9263** 7.37563 
∆ALLOTTED_TALF(−3))   −9.0642* 5.14589 
∆ALLOTTED_TSLF(−3))   −0.3918* 0.20533 
∆SAT_RATE_PDCF)   −0.0015*** 0.00035 
∆SAT_RATE_PDCF(−1))     0.0009** 0.00038 
∆SAT_RATE_PDCF(−3))     0.0013*** 0.00033 
∆SAT_RATE_TAF)   −0.0007 0.00042 
∆SAT_RATE_TAF(−1))   −0.0022*** 0.00072 
∆SAT_RATE_TAF(−3))   −0.0018*** 0.00067 
∆SAT_RATE_TALF(−2))     0.0008*** 0.00029 
∆SAT_RATE_TSLF(−2))     0.0011** 0.00052 
∆SAT_RATE_AMLF)     0.0013** 0.00051 
∆SAT_RATE_AMLF(−2))   −0.0009** 0.00046 
∆SAT_RATE_AMLF(−3))   −0.0026*** 0.00060 
  ECM_LIBOR(−1)   −0.1256*** 0.03247 
  2 0.435R = , ˆ 0.112σ = , 1.422AIC = −  
 (°) Newey-West Heteroskedasticity AutoCorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors 
  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level 
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Appendix A - Impulse Response Functions on the Euribor-Eonia Spread 
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Appendix B - Impulse Response Functions on the Libor-OIS Spread 
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